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1. Introduction 
Classical liberals seek the paradoxical: government powerful enough to protect individuals from 
preying off each other, but limited enough to prevent it becoming a fierce predator itself 
(Buchanan, 2000). Theory and history show us two promising related solutions. The first is 
constitutional government establishing legal protections for persons and their property along 
with procedural constraints to prevent officials from abusing their positions (Buchanan and 
Congleton, 2003; Hayek, 2011). The second is competitive jurisdictions that allow individuals to 
select their rulers, thus disciplining governments that fail in their legitimate role (Buchanan, 
2001; Hirschman, 2004; Weingast, 1995).  At the radical limits of these approaches, the classical 
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liberal project blends with the anarchist and libertarian projects of having government 
exclusively by consent and contract (D’Amico, 2012; Leeson, 2014; Meadowcroft, 2014; 
Nozick, 2013). Where successfully adopted, even in piecemeal and uneven fashion, these 
solutions have been responsible for the remarkable peace and prosperity witnessed in what is 
commonly called the developed world (McCloskey, 2007; Shleifer, 2009). But they have still 
failed in their endeavor to prevent government, local, national and international, from being the 
single biggest threat to individual liberty and prosperity. 
Against this backdrop, blockchain could turn out to be what Davidson et al. (2018, p. 640) and 
Berg et al. (2018, p. 386) describe as a new ‘institutional technology’ that supplements existing 
forms of market governance and may eventually offer political actors a more effective way to 
limit government. Blockchains offer a more secure and transparent way of implementing rules 
while permitting individual choice between rulesets that can co-exist at the same time and place. 
What this could ultimately mean is that a great deal of what has traditionally been conceived as 
governance might be disintermediated from the territorially defined monopolistic coercive 
authorities that classically define states. James Buchanan (2000, chap. 8) imagines an ideal 
constitutional government to be a programmable agent that once established mechanically 
enforces the rules of the social game. What blockchains can do is bring that thought experiment a 
little closer to reality. With lower barriers to producing and choosing self-enforcing rulesets, the 
project of seeking better governance can come closer to the competitive discovery procedure 
that, as Hayek (1976, 2014) identifies, consistently produces enormous social gains in the 
provision of other goods and services. 
How can government be reasonably conceived as an enterprise potentially subject to 
competition? In making this a point of departure, this paper draws on private governance, a 
buoyant sub-field of New Institutional Economics (NIE). Central to NIE is the study of 
transaction costs (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). The basic premise is that people possess 
enormous potential to cooperate in productive ways, but in the absence of systems of co-
ordination, lack the necessary knowledge and mutual trust to succeed. In other words, there are 
prohibitive transaction costs to successful cooperation that institutions (that is durable norms and 
laws) can reduce, mediated by other factors such as culture, available resources and technology.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3223728 
3 
 
NIE’s focus on transaction costs permits a more refined understanding of the paradox facing 
classical liberalism. The key challenge of liberal political economy is designing protective and 
productive institutions (those that lower transaction costs for ordinary people) in such a way that 
political elites are incentivized to supply those institutions, and not simply exploit their 
privileged position to extract rents from the population (Acemoglu, 2003). From this realistic 
standpoint, it is not enough simply to know what rules would work best between equals. The 
presently powerful must be persuaded that it is in their interests to abide by rules they set for 
others, as well as assure ordinary people that the powerful will hold up their side of the bargain.  
Through this lens, scholars have conceptualized the challenges that political actors face as 
paralleling the kind that private actors must solve when attempting to cooperate. The private 
governance research program proposes that establishing and enforcing governing rules is a kind 
of enterprise undertaken by people who see opportunities for profit from supplying order to a 
community, and thus end up solving widespread challenges to cooperation (Leeson and Boettke, 
2009). There is an anti-establishment anarchic bent to this literature insofar as it conceives even 
modern states not as intrinsically noble enterprises aimed at achieving the public good but more 
as the unintended beneficial result of the successful organized violence of the past whose 
resulting political settlements have been refined so as to spread the gains of social order to a 
wider population (North et al., 2009; Skarbek, 2014). From this perspective, whether a governing 
institution is formally considered a state or part of the state, as opposed to a private organization, 
does not establish a particularly important distinction since state legitimacy is often founded on 
agreements between self-interested, powerful private actors (Salter, 2015a, 2015b) while private 
association often end up producing widespread social good more normally associated with public 
activity (Stringham, 2015). Despite this profound skepticism of the inherent legitimacy of 
political authority and individuals who seek political power, underlying this research agenda is a 
fundamental recognition of the value of fixed rules, especially those that provide for the 
ownership and exchange of property, and enforceable contracts for goods and services. So there 
is recognition of the positive contribution that relatively well-ordered states have made to human 
welfare. 
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In addition to these concepts from private governance, this paper uses an older idea from 
political thought: the lawgiver,1 someone who establishes a fundamental new governance 
regime. This role bares a close resemblance to the role of the political entrepreneur in the private 
governance literature. On my account, what blockchains offer is a new mechanism by which a 
lawgiver can selectively alienate themselves from some of their power and thus commit not to 
predate off their subordinates in the future. In the ideal, they could alienate their elite status 
altogether and become subject to the exact set of institutions that are enforced equally on all 
members of a community. But leaving utopian ideas aside, as it stands, changing governing rules 
either implies violent revolution or costly contestation within a democratic process. Neither 
approaches look anything like a competitive market and offer little guarantee of improvement 
over a status quo. In essence, blockchains are a technology for lowering at least some of the 
formidable transaction costs associated with moving from one set of rules to another. My 
account has parallels with Catalini and Gans’ (2018) account of blockchain as a technology that 
lowers costs associated with verification and networking in commercial setting. I extend this idea 
to include costs associated with establishing credibility and assurance between rulers and ruled. 
This explanation for the role of blockchains for the liberal enterprise proceeds as follows. The 
paper continues with a description of the characteristics of blockchain technology, including 
what has made it suitable for developing cryptocurrencies, autonomous systems of monetary 
exchange that are supposed to replace state-backed currencies. Then it discusses how this 
technology can facilitate other ways of reducing transaction costs over physical distance and in 
absence of personal trust, especially establishing contracts and record-keeping. It illustrates the 
particular power of blockchains’ decentralized process to challenge bad policy with an example 
of it filling gaps in regulation left by the refusal of governments to supply legal protection and 
security to sex workers. Then it discusses how this experience can be applied to the wicked 
problem of contracting between political elites and subjects when it comes to establishing 
government itself. It ends with a discussion of some vulnerabilities facing political reformers 
 
1 The term lawgiver is used here as it is sufficiently general as to include political actors operating as part of state 
government as we presently understand it, while leaving open the possibility of rule-making actors operating outside 
of state authority. It also refers to the classical concept of the lawgiver as constitutional founder found in Aristotle 
(1981) and Rousseau (1923). The potential institutional ramifications of blockchain technology are sufficiently 
revolutionary that their explanation is best understood with reference to fundamental problems and models in 
political thought. Section 4 has more detailed explanation of the role of the lawgiver in this explanation for the 
contribution of blockchain technology to governance. 
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who wish to use blockchain governance in a democratic direction, and some ways that 
contemporary policymakers can use blockchain technology to improve the quality of 
governance. 
2. What is a blockchain? 
The precise definition of a blockchain is contested, as is often the case for innovations that are 
partly conceptual. However, they are essentially the combination of two technologies that are 
already widely used. The first is distributed ledgers, publicly shared databases of transactions 
that are replicated and shared across networks. The second is asymmetrical cryptography (the use 
of paired public and private keys) which allows for the secure transmission of transactions across 
a public network that are only accessible to a recipient holding the correct private key. 
These transactions are secured through participating nodes on the network algorithmically 
generating hashes that are periodically added as a new block. A hash is a string of data of 
consistent (relatively short) length that acts as a unique identifier that can validate the 
transactions that were recorded in making it. This result is that, unlike other shared ledgers, 
transactions recorded on a blockchain cannot be singled-out, manipulated or reversed by any 
authority once added (Böhme et al., 2015). 
In this early and evolving sector, classifying different kinds of blockchains is a significant 
challenge. Davidson et al. (2018, pp. 642–646) have made a valuable contribution to this task by 
distinguishing the core discovery. The original blockchain, Bitcoin, and several others are 
essentially a public ledger where copies of the underlying history of transactions are 
disseminated throughout a network rather than being possessed by a trusted state or corporation. 
The cryptographic rules generate a consensus engine which ensures all the network nodes agree 
on what transactions took place as they are added to the growing record. With the addition of a 
programmable scripting language, a public ledger can be turned into a smart ledger, of which 
Ethereum is currently the most prominent example. This is a publicly accessible chain that stores 
not only data, but executable programs and applications that are publicly readable and secured in 
such a way that users can be confident they will execute predictably given the correct inputs. 
This is the basis for smart contracts, essentially exchanges of value or control rights that are 
agreed and complete automatically when one party delivers a particular input. 
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What makes blockchains interesting from the perspective of private governance is that they can 
function like constitutional rules, dispersing rights and powers to configure elements of a shared 
environment, and introducing constraints on each actor’s behavior (Rajagopalan, 2018). 
However, traditional constitutions require a human administration that is committed to enforcing 
the rules in particular cases to work (paradigmatically a state administration in large 
communities). It is easy for such an administration to end up enforcing rules and rights 
selectively. By contrast, due to the crypto-embedded nature of individual events on the 
blockchain, the discretion that individuals have to selectively enforce (or reverse) such events or 
decision is substantially reduced. Participants can ignore the results of interactions within a 
blockchain altogether (and cease supporting it), or they can accept them more or less as a whole. 
This broadens the scope for maintaining procedural integrity and general enforcement without 
relying on particular individual officers to do the enforcing in an impartial way. 
2.1 Use as currency 
To better explain this use of blockchain technology, it is perhaps best to compare it to cash. This 
is apt because the initial aim of blockchain development has been as cryptocurrency, monetary 
systems resistant to manipulation and surveillance, especially by governments. Cash notes are 
easily transferable artefacts denoting value. Notes are almost perfectly interchangeable with each 
other so it is impossible to decode or unravel the series of transactions that have led to you 
having that note in your hand. They are self-certifying. Having cash in your hand is sufficient to 
establish that you possess its value. There is no need for anyone to check your personal 
ownership of the note against a central authority such as a bank, as is the case for credit and 
money transfers. Indeed, it is for these reasons that governments and policymakers have 
increasingly come to treat cash with such suspicion despite it being such a useful ally of state 
capacity in the past. Police in many jurisdictions are now authorized and encouraged to 
arbitrarily seize suspiciously large cash holdings. Government policies increasingly encourage 
people to use transfers and savings mechanisms whose legitimacy are ultimately determined by 
some reachable authority. 
So how does cryptocurrency differ from cash? Cash is difficult to forge but far from impossible. 
This necessitates criminal prohibition and expensive schemes of enforcement to secure its value. 
Although lightweight and convenient, cash is still physical with inevitable additional costs to 
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transfer (especially over large distances). By contrast, cryptocurrency can be transferred 
instantaneously across the Internet and stored discreetly on portable digital media. Unlike 
electronic money orders, personal access to a cryptographic artefact (through a private key) is 
what determines ownership. There is no other agent that has to recognize its authenticity for it be 
valid. These artefacts are also essentially impossible to forge as they are validated against a 
constantly updated public record. 
Critically, no central agency is capable of unilaterally creating and spending new currency. The 
blockchain records transactions through nodes processing new blocks as part of a network. 
Blockchain schemes permit ‘mining’ which produces new artefacts through a computationally 
intensive hashing algorithm but this activity is accessible to anyone participating in the network. 
New blocks are created according to pre-established rules that the blockchain designers 
themselves cannot unilaterally manipulate once it is part of a larger network. Unlike state-backed 
fiat currencies, or bank credit systems, no agent stands behind the process to offer some final 
backing. Instead, it is the collective production and consensus formation of the network based on 
fixed rules that determines holdings. It is ultimately the participants in the network that constitute 
the system and its value. Currency issuance, previously the preserve of powerful elites, could 
instead be subject to significant competition and public participation. 
2.2 Use for purchases and contracting 
As described above, blockchains do not only provide exchangeable artefacts that are highly 
resistant to forgery. They also create a permanent, growing record of all transactions. So thinking 
back to the cash comparison, imagine that when you are handed a cash note, not only is it a self-
certifying artefact of value, but that on inspection you can quickly see the transaction history of 
the note from when it was printed to the point you received it (cf. Kocherlakota, 1998). This has 
the disadvantage of reducing the anonymity of the exchange as the transaction history of each 
artefact, and each entry on the public ledger, is unique (Biryukov et al., 2014). But it also opens 
up a lot more potential uses for these blockchain artefacts than currency alone. 
Software designers and entrepreneurs are starting to exploit this feature. In principle, it is 
possible to validate any information against a blockchain. This can include identity documents, 
digital signatures, as well as media files. So association with a block can be used to validate the 
time and place of production as well as establish title over digital information. It is also possible 
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to set up conditional transactions. For example, an artist could setup a scheme to release a piece 
of media automatically on receipt of a certain monetary value. The release could be limited to 
specific recipients or made free to the public once a certain value is pledged by purchasers acting 
independently. Indeed, the majority of transactions on the Ethereum blockchain now take the 
form of smart contracts such as these. 
Entrepreneurs are also beginning to work out how to integrate such systems into the provision of 
‘real-world’ goods and services (Zhao et al., 2016). For example, a decentralized replacement to 
Uber or Lyft could automatically construct a smart contract that pays a driver on condition that a 
passenger (with a blockchain integrated app on their smartphone) is delivered to their 
destination. This is without the need for a company middleman. One currently active 
decentralized enterprise allows air travelers to insure against flight delays by paying into a 
decentralized insurance pool.2 The insurance policies pay out automatically according to public 
online flight data. The upshot of these experiments could be the replacing of many traditional 
firms, with human owners and managers, with decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs): 
mutual participatory schemes that establish individual roles, duties and payoffs through 
transparent self-executing rules built into computer code rather than hierarchies. 
3. Decentralization to avoid prohibition 
DAOs might be able to replace the human management layer of some firms. But what are the 
implications of DAOs for the provision of governance in particular? Technology firms already 
provide a great deal of governance services. But these firms up until now have relied critically on 
a centralization of administration to establish an organized network that lowers transaction costs. 
This creates both an opportunity for monopoly profits from whoever has built the network. As 
Catalani and Gans (2018) have argued, this presents a problem in itself as, absent effective 
competition, it permits private platform-owning incumbents to censor and degrade services. 
Moreover, it also presents an obvious target for authorities that wish to exert control over the 
system. As a result these systems of governance inevitably become entangled with state 
authorities (Allen et al., 2018; Wagner, 2016). For example, mass surveillance of a weakly 
connected population relying on lots of small and informal schemes to communicate is a very 
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costly affair. But it is quite different once a population is carrying smart devices built by a 
handful of firms, served by a few telecommunications companies and a dozen major content 
providers. Then it is relatively easy for state actors to identify a number of strategic choke points 
that allow them access to vast amounts of information about people’s public and private lives. 
These points in the system are controlled by firms that can be easily coopted to achieve political 
ends or threatened should they refuse to cooperate. 
The vulnerability of technology-aided private enterprise to unilateral state regulation is 
illustrated by the recent prohibition of advertising for sex work following the passing of the 
FOSTA-SESTA acts by the United States government and the resulting seizure of Backpage, a 
website and platform that helped sex workers to meet and vet their clients (Q, 2018). 
Suppressing sex work can be costly and unpopular. It involves sending police to harass an 
economically marginalized group (usually female sex workers) as well as prosecuting members 
of the public who are willing to pay for sex. It is, however, much easier to prohibit platforms that 
facilitate sex work: to ban the advertising and remote coordination of sex work services. This can 
be expected to have a substantial negative impact on the sector as sex workers have become 
increasingly reliant on technology to secure their safety when meeting clients (Sanders et al., 
2018). In this case, the state not only refuses to facilitate transactions between consenting adults 
on spurious moral grounds but, in addition, can prevent anyone else from creating a private 
governing framework that allows such transactions to take place with relative safety. 
Critical to this strategy of prohibition working is the reliance of individual market participants 
(sex workers and clients) on platforms. Up until now, these platforms had a personal or 
commercial owner that can usually be identified and punished by state officials. By contrast, 
DAOs, once released, have no owner and persist through the decision of individuals to 
participate in them. If these individual participants are able to coordinate enough to get this 
practice initially off the ground, then the state has to go back to the costly practice of identifying 
individual users to punish rather than a central owner who can be publicly identified and 
punished as a ‘criminal exploiter’ in their role as middleman. This system would not be able to 
be shut off at a single point. A blockchain start-up, Spankchain3 is entering this sector and may 
 
3 https://spankchain.com/  
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eventually provide a critical replacement for sex workers seeking a safe and secure framework 
for marketing their services out of reach of state regulation. 
4. Prospects for political entrepreneurship 
The potential to replace some traditional firms with DAOs is enough on its own to indicate the 
disruptive potential of blockchains, precisely because DAOs can better resist regulation from 
state authorities. Indeed, blockchain organizations are already being used to ameliorate the worst 
cases of government failure, for example in the case of currency collapse in Venezuela (England 
and Fratrik, 2018). This is without any pretense of taking over traditional state functions under 
ordinary circumstances. But technology that disrupts the formation of firms in such a 
fundamental way as blockchains might be able to similarly challenge states before too long. 
The ‘business’ of government is supplying the peace, law and order necessary for ordinary 
people to engage in mutual cooperation. This is traditionally achieved through establishing a 
territorial monopoly on the use of violence. The challenge that a sovereign government faces is 
eliciting economic production from the land and people under her control. Paradoxically, this is 
no easy feat for an absolute sovereign facing little internal or external competition. Even if she 
wants to encourage productive activity, she has little means to credibly show she will not 
expropriate the fruits of her people’s labor (Ma and Rubin, 2019). That is, unless she is willing to 
alienate at least some of her power which could also undermine the security of her position as 
sovereign, a dangerous proposition when the control over legitimate violence is at stake (Bueno 
de Mesquita et al., 2005). Even if the possibilities of productive exchange between ruler and 
ruled is widely acknowledged, the institutions that benefit both sovereign and the people can be 
hard to reach through a series of decisions that make rational sense at each stage to both parties. 
In a well-functioning market economy, credibility amongst private actors can be assured through 
the state protecting people’s property and enforcing voluntary contracts. But no such 
mechanisms are available to facilitate exchanges of rights and duties between the sovereign 
herself and her subjects. The historical record suggests that credibility can be established either 
when subjects have independent capacity to exit unfair arrangements or when external threats 
(such as the existence of enemy states that threaten subject and sovereign alike) happen to bring 
their interests together (Salter, 2015b). This is why the history of liberal political economy is one 
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of elites and citizens grappling and fumbling towards mutually beneficial arrangements that very 
occasionally, and mostly by good fortune, turn out to be stable. 
The same challenge of reaching a fair and successful political settlement between an elite and the 
people crops up under slightly different descriptions throughout the history of political thought 
when examining the founding of new regimes. This was a challenge for Rousseau in particular 
who in The Social Contract envisaged an ideal society based on democratic equality where each 
citizens follows the general will: the common and true interests of an entire body of people 
(Rousseau, 1923, bk. 1 Ch 6). Although certainly not a classical liberal project aiming at limited 
government, Rousseau’s polity faces the same vexing issue of transition: how to reform the laws 
of a corrupt regime when the laws themselves habituate citizens to shirking their duties, leaving 
them unable and unfit to rule themselves effectively (Rousseau, 1923, bk. 2 Ch 6). Rousseau’s 
answer, a deus ex machina figure, is that a successful regime-change or democratic reform 
requires a special individual: a lawgiver4 who establishes new laws that drives out corruption and 
allows the people to transition to true self-government (Rousseau, 1923, bk. 2 Ch 7). 
The key challenge is getting a lawgiver with the power to defeat corruption within the people 
while driving out external threats; the knowledge to enact with care the laws best suited to the 
new polity; yet at the same the strength of moral commitment not to exploit her privileged 
position; and willingness to step down at the right moment. The responsibility and skill required 
of the lawgiver as Rousseau outlines seem to require virtually divine qualities.5 The problem for 
any lawgiver is that the ability to change the law or control its execution after establishing a new 
constitution involves an overwhelming temptation to corruption, to end up favoring oneself and 
one’ associates. Any new regime, where credible norms of public spiritedness and general legal 
constraints have yet to be established, is particularly vulnerable to fall back into opportunistic 
predation within the political sphere. Rousseau drew from the quasi-mythological figures of 
ancient Greek founders, as well as several Italian city states, to propose that the closest you can 
get to a non-divine lawgiver is often a foreign founder (Rousseau, 1923, bk. 2 Chapter 7). The 
advantage of a foreign lawgiver is that she has fewer personal interests in the area where the 
 
4 This is sometimes translated as ‘legislator’. ‘Lawgiver’ helps to distinguish the constitutional founder from 
legislators in representative governments that Rousseau did not consider to be the same role. 
5 Unsurprisingly, this legendary persona that represents the true interests of a presently corrupted people has also 
been deployed to support some of the most authoritarian political movements in modern history. 
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regime is established and can credibly assure the people that she will depart when the time is 
right. She can act more effectively as a more neutral arbiter between factions and interests, and 
then execute judgement from a position of independent. Honig (2001) shows that the ‘foreigner 
as founder’ myth crops up repeatedly from ancient to contemporary fiction, including in such 
diverse places as the Western movie Shane and the Wizard of Oz, and that establishing several 
successful modern constitutional regimes has often involved having foreigners in positions of 
power. All this reminds us how important and special the lawgiver is for developing well-
performing institutions. Yet it also shows how her effectiveness relies not just on her intrinsic 
qualities but the circumstances in which she finds herself and her particular background. We are 
reminded that the process of political reform relies on accidents and fortunes of history. 
How can blockchains help with overcoming these challenges to establishing the circumstances in 
which a lawgiver can demonstrate some of these rare qualities? In essence, blockchain 
institutions means that the circumstances in which a lawgiver could act to introduce impartial 
rules is wider than has traditionally been possible. First, they offer a new way of tackling the 
assurance problem between the governor and the governed. Traditional laws have to be enforced 
continuously by inevitably partial and fallible human agents. Worse, those in power can 
ultimately renege on their commitments to abide by them. By contrast, a lawgiver acting as an 
entrepreneur with blockchain programming knowledge can develop a ruleset, release it, and then 
stand down from their privileged institutional position. If the ruleset is advantageous to social 
cooperation, then people will start participating in the scheme and its use will spread.  
A traditional political entrepreneur (very often a conqueror) profits from their enterprise by 
establishing the authority to tax others. By contrast, a law-giving entrepreneur with a blockchain 
constitution can set aside some assets or tokens associated with their governance structure for 
themselves. If their structure is successful, then those assets will become valuable and 
exchangeable for ordinary goods and services. Just as a private entrepreneur can look forward to 
reaping a profit by selling off an asset they have developed, this offers a way for a governance 
provider to ‘cash’ out their investment in rulemaking. 
Second, decentralized systems can be designed to be somewhat resistant to entanglement with 
existing political authorities. Once a designer releases a blockchain to the public, it is no longer 
under their control. Hence there is no individual to co-opt, threaten or manipulate. The successful 
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lawgiver does not need to stand apart from the regime so as not to be corrupted but, without any 
additional power over others, blends back into the society as an ordinary citizen. This means that 
any lawgiver, and not just a foreigner who finds themselves in the circumstances of being able to 
enact reform, can credibly commit to leave their position. Moreover, anyone with knowledge of 
blockchain programing can design and reform governance systems. It will be impossible to 
suppress a successful ruleset as it can be easily reproduced. So changing the rules to reflect 
narrow interests after the fact will be much harder. 
Finally, because of their nature as digital media, blockchains can facilitate rapid competition 
between rulesets. They rely very little on physical infrastructure or human administrators for 
efficacy as states traditionally do. As a result, there is little physical limit to how many of these 
schemes can be in operation simultaneously. They can be made interoperable: blockchains can 
be established so that they can read data off each other. Blockchains can also be cloned privately 
and edited before being re-released. They do not have to be built each time from scratch. So 
when one particular system fails or requires upgrading, people can switch to a new one with 
different rules but with the same private keys accessing the same parts of the new public ledger 
based on the previous iteration. This means that the rules of the game going forward can be 
changed by the mutual consent of participants moving to a new blockchain (Markey-Towler, 
2018). This can happen without displacing the particular positions and entitlements of the 
existing participants. 
These three contributions from blockchain technology can bring us closer to an ideal of private 
governance. Government itself can start to become subject to the relatively rational and benign 
principles of commerce rather than the coercive processes of politics. 
5. Vulnerabilities of blockchain governance 
This paper has painted quite a rosy future for blockchain based governance so far. But 
blockchain users face distinct vulnerabilities as well, and these will probably bite the more 
apparent the revolutionary potential of this technology becomes. An obvious issue is physical 
theft of private keys, as well as hacking computer systems in order to steal private key 
information. Hacking has proved to be a particular problem because of the unanticipated 
emergence and popularity of blockchain exchanges that hold digital assets on behalf of users. 
These exchanges function rather like banks for traditional currencies with all the usual security 
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concerns but operate across national boundaries and without specific legal protections. One 
exchange, Coinbase has attempted to ameliorate this vulnerable position by keeping 99 per cent 
of its assets inaccessible to the Internet, with the remaining ‘live’ one per cent insured by Lloyd’s 
of London (Fung, 2018).  
Another problem is that ownership within blockchains are currently extremely lumpy with a 
handful of ‘whales’ heavily invested in both assets and the specialized hardware for mining new 
blocks. This problem is compounded by the high-energy requirements for economically 
productive mining. At a certain scale, these market actors can distort the participatory hashing 
process by refusing to validate some transactions. As a result, a critical challenge for designers is 
working out network rules that minimize the use of energy resources and punish badly behaved 
network nodes by withholding mining fees from actors that deviate from generating blockchain 
consensus. 
5.1 Democratic conceits 
Besides external hacking from outside a ruleset, a key challenge is developing code that cannot 
be manipulated within the rules of the game itself. The most prominent failure so far was the first 
DAO whose code was exploited to transfer assets to a single account and then exchanged out of 
the system (Dhillon et al., 2017). The flaw in the code was the result of attempts to integrate 
participatory voting into the decision process along with constraints to prevent the majority from 
exploiting the minority. Catastrophic failures such as these are forcing blockchain designers a to 
discover fundamental insights already well-known in social choice theory that show that no 
open-ended decision procedure outside of dictatorship is immune to manipulation or chaotic 
outcomes (Arrow, 1950; Boettke and Leeson, 2002). This does not imply that introducing 
democratic processes into a blockchain governance mechanism is impossible or unwise, only 
that designers must be particularly alert to the problem of outcome-manipulation within 
democratic rules in the absence of trust. This is a particular challenge in anonymous governance 
schemes because there are few constraints on self-dealing (people can make use of multiple 
private identities which is harder in physical interactions). An important step in making 
blockchain democratic processes resistant to manipulation will likely include the promulgation 
of a credible self-sovereign identity scheme (Der et al., 2017).  
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In the meantime, attempts to integrate classic democratic mechanisms like majority voting into 
blockchain governance could show premature ambition. Blockchain governance solutions do not 
lack for democratic credentials even without formal voting mechanisms or systems of 
representation. Blockchains allow a wider range of people not only to propose new governing 
rules, but also to implement and test them. Meanwhile, it allows people to select the rules 
governing their interactions much more easily. In this sense, a blockchain ecosystem helps to 
tackle the perennial problem of agenda-setting and manipulation of more traditional democratic 
processes. In this context, the process of writing and implementing particular rulesets does not 
need to be conducted by vote or committee for the process to be democratic in this broad sense 
of reflecting and responding to the interests of participants in the governing scheme. 
Classical liberals emphasize the power of exit from political arrangements as a necessary part of 
political accountability (Pennington, 2010). Blockchain schemes allow people to exit without 
needing to use their actual feet as often. In comparison, voting, especially at large scale, can 
often be an ineffectual way of providing feedback to a system or holding rulers to account. To be 
successful, blockchain governance entrepreneurs should approach democratic mechanisms with 
great care while recognizing that processes of competition can play a substantial role in holding 
the relatively powerful to account. 
6. Policy implications 
What should the response of state regulators and other more traditional political actors be to the 
emergence of blockchains as a new institutional technology? A significant portion of early 
participants in blockchain saw the movement as a direct challenge to state government and an 
anarchist strain is still prominent in contemporary innovators in the field. Satoshi Nakamoto 
(2008) launched bitcoin out of dissatisfaction with the way that state-backed central bankers 
manage fiat currency with the intent of providing a means of exiting existing monetary regimes 
in favor of an entirely new currency system. This paper too places some emphasis on the way 
that blockchain technology allows for extra-legal governance that challenges existing policy 
priorities, especially in the way that a decentralized governance regime can protect transactions 
(such as those involving consensual sex work) that state authorities do not wish to facilitate or 
actively wish to discourage. So it might appear that the interests of existing political authorities 
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are necessarily at odds with any new governing mechanism that blockchain technology causes to 
emerge (cf. Berg, Markey‐Towler, et al., 2018). 
That interpretation of this account would be an over-simplification. From the perspective of 
private governance, there is little difference in kind between public officials and governance 
provided through private means and civil society. The ability to choose to place credible 
constraints on one’s conduct dramatically expands the scale and scope of cooperation regardless 
of one’s formal institutional position. This is precisely what makes the protection of property and 
the ability to enforce contracts valuable for a community. This basic insight applies to traditional 
political actors as much as private citizens or radical reformers. This is also reflected in historical 
analysis of political development that suggests that both the scope and complexity of market 
exchange has grown in parallel to state capacity and that the two are often mutually supporting 
(Johnson and Koyama, 2017). It plausible for an institutional technology like blockchain to 
simultaneously facilitate the growth of market exchange while also helping to expand the 
protective and productive capacities of the state. 
So there is not necessarily much to fear and instead quite a lot of new opportunities for 
policymakers to use blockchains to supply public services more effectively. For the time-being, 
during this initial period of experimentation and innovation, prudent policymakers should allow 
the new sector to develop and refrain from introducing prohibitive regulation, especially those 
that attempt to slot blockchain artefacts into inappropriate regulatory architecture. Formal legal 
recognition (rather than direct regulation) of prevailing blockchain entities and practices might 
be useful for signaling that the sector has a role in the legitimate economy and encouraging 
mainstream commercial entrepreneurs to enter the sector. An example of this approach is found 
in Wyoming where the state legislature that has attempted to pre-empt federal regulatory interest 
in defining blockchain assets as securities (which would place significant limits on who is 
permitted to hold them), by defining digital assets as real property and money (Bain, 2018). 
Similarly, Ohio has announced that it welcomes tax payments in Bitcoin and this is likely to help 
facilitate the growth and legitimacy of blockchain ventures (Vigna, 2018). 
Even at this relatively early stage, there are some more direct ways in which blockchain 
technology might be used to facilitate better public governance. A promising use-case is 
enhancing the way that private data can be shared securely and voluntarily with government 
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agencies (Allen et al., 2018). Both public services and private companies alike make systematic 
use of sensitive private data, and both frequently lose or corrupt data in ways that can end up 
harming individuals. Information about citizens is useful (occasionally critical) for making 
service provision more effective. In the public sector, things like the sharing of patient medical 
data across a health system and to allied social and welfare services can save and improve lives. 
At the same time, the widespread dissemination of personal information about health, wellbeing 
and lifestyle can violate dignity and make people vulnerable to fraud and exploitation.  
The way that official databases are organized typically renders vast amounts of data accessible in 
general to an unnecessarily large number of individuals. As a result, it is quite easy for data to be 
lost, stolen, sold to third parties, changed in error or in unauthorized ways. The way that the data 
is collected and stored in what can amount to a common pool means that it is amenable to 
function creep. For example, health-service data can be deployed to aid immigration enforcement 
or policing. The fact that this can happen means that some citizens reasonably fear sharing data 
with any government agency. This makes some citizens fearful of giving data even for legitimate 
public uses. We can conceive this current situation as an example of the assurance problem 
outlined in the previous section. It is in the interests of both citizens and government to share 
data. But government agencies lack the credibility that the data will only be used to protect 
citizens and produce public goods. The data can also be used in exploitative or predatory ways. 
Blockchain technology can provide more opportunities for citizens to hold authorities 
accountable for failures to uphold data security (Muzammal et al., 2019). The blockchain can 
allow database information to be distributed in a secure format across the Internet so there is less 
reliance on a single organization to keeping it accessible and ensuring it is free of errors. Storing 
it cryptographically can render it impossible to decrypt the whole database and steal data en 
masse. Access rules can be refined and customized so that data records are only accessible with 
permission from the user or authorized controller. In addition, by offering access to a permanent, 
growing history, it can be possible to track exactly when and where a data record has been 
accessed, and how and when it has been amended. Hence, blockchains can contribute to assuring 
data protection by design rather than by policy or administrative procedure. It reduces the 
amount of trust in other institutions required to keep data secure (Davidson et al., 2018, p. 644). 
It is thus a promising development that the State of Colorado recently passed legislation 
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encouraging their local government agencies to consider using encryption and blockchain for 
public recordkeeping (Huillet, 2018). 
7. Conclusion 
Unlike many other social processes, governments have yet to be subject to an effective 
competitive discovery procedure. This is because of the huge transaction costs associated with 
transitions from one set of rules to another, especially the challenge of establishing credible 
commitments with actors whose power is based on existing rulesets. Blockchains offer a path to 
competitive governance because they allow people to create and participate in self-enforcing 
rulesets. They can be copied and reformed quickly and can co-exist much more easily than 
traditional governance structures. 
Blockchains have already produced promising applications for navigating around government 
regulation that fails to serve the interests of market participants. Imaginative policymakers and 
reformers are starting to explore ways of using blockchains to contribute to public service 
provision by helping to generate credible commitments about the way personal data will be used 
by authorities. Before too long, blockchains might begin to subject core aspects of government 
itself to competition. 
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